Estimation of social-influence-dependent peer pressures in a large
  network game by Lin, Zhongjian & Xu, Haiqing
ESTIMATION OF SOCIAL–INFLUENCE–DEPENDENT PEER PRESSURES IN A
LARGE NETWORK GAME
ZHONGJIAN LIN? AND HAIQING XU†
ABSTRACT. Research on peer effects in sociology has been focused for long on so-
cial influence power to investigate the social foundations for social interactions. This
paper extends Xu (forthcoming)’s large–network–based game model by allowing for
social–influence–dependent peer effects. In a large network, we use the Katz–Bonacich
centrality to measure individuals’ social influences. To solve the computational burden
when the data come from the equilibrium of a large network, we extend Aguirregabiria
and Mira (2007)’s nested pseudo likelihood estimation (NPLE) approach to our large
network game model. Using the Add Health dataset, we investigate peer effects on
conducting dangerous behaviors of high school students. Our results show that peer
effects are statistically significant and positive. Moreover, a student benefits more (statis-
tically significant at the 5% level) from her conformity, or equivalently, pays more for
her disobedience, in terms of peer pressures, if friends have higher social-influence status.
Keywords: social interactions, large network, peer effects, social influence, nested
pseudo likelihood estimation
JEL: C57; C62; C72; Z13.
Date: Tuesday 17th July, 2018.
∗A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “Identification and Estimation of
Hierarchy Effects in Social Interactions.” We thank Anton Badev, Mark Hoekstra, Cheng Hsiao, Hae–shin
Hwang, Jason Lindo, Xiaodong Liu, Essie Maasoumi, Steven Puller, Robin Sickles, Qi Li, Ken Wolpin, Mo
Xiao, Keli Xu and participants at Econometric Society Summer Meeting 2014, Texas Econometrics Camp
2014, Emory, Monash, UT Austin and Texas A&M for helpful feedbacks. We also thank Stephanie White
for proofreading this paper. Supports from the ICPSR and Carolina Population Center of the National
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health dataset are gratefully acknowledged.
?Department of Economics, Emory University, Room 332, Rich Memorial Building, Atlanta, GA 30322,
zhongjian.lin@emory.edu.
‡Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin, h.xu@austin.utexas.edu.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
61
2.
02
51
2v
1 
 [s
tat
.M
E]
  8
 D
ec
 20
16
1. INTRODUCTION
Game theoretic network models have been successful to study social interactions
which has been traditional focuses of sociology. A leading example is network formation,
e.g. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996); Bala and Goyal (2000) from the theory side. Another
example considers social interactions in exogenously given large networks, e.g. Blume,
Brock, Durlauf, and Jayaraman (2015); Xu (forthcoming). In this paper, we extend Xu
(forthcoming)’s large–network–based game model by allowing for social–influence–
dependent peer effects. In particular, our research question is whether individuals of
high social influence (measured by network centrality) impose more peer pressures to
their followers than individuals of low social influence.
Network positions are particularly important in studying all kinds of social interac-
tions. In sociology, researchers use network centrality, a concept introduced already
in the late 1940’s, to measure a social individual’s position, influence and prestige.
In network–related policy analysis, it is always disputable whether key players in a
social network are more influential than ordinary indivdiuals simply due to their large
number of followers and/or more central positions in the network, i.e. the “channel
effects” (see e.g. Ibarra and Andrews, 1993; Burt, 1995), or because of their extraordinary
influence ability on their followers, i.e. the social influence effects. The answer to this
question is crucial to evaluate e.g. targeting–and–remove key player policy (Lee, Liu,
Patacchini, and Zenou, 2012).
This paper builds upon Xu (forthcoming)’s large–network structural approach. In
particular, we assume an individual’s payoff from her decision depends on her own
covariates, as well as her direct friends’ choices. As the fundamental principal in sociol-
ogy, players benefits from choosing the same action of friends. There is an important
substantive difference, however: we allow peer’s pressures/benefits for conformity
to vary with friends’ (relative) social influence/prestige, which is measured by the
Katz–Bonacich centrality (see e.g. Katz, 1953; Bonacich, 1987). Such an extension is
motivated from empirical applications on network–based policy analysis. Consider
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e.g. the targeting–and–remove key player policy. The constant peer pressure model
will necessarily underestimate key players’ effects on their peers by diluting them with
ordinary players’ peer pressures, if there are (economically significant) influence effects
on peer pressures. The inconsistent estimator of peer effects could further mislead the
next stage counterfactual analysis of the policy. Moreover, in our empirical application,
i.e., studying dangerous behaviors of high school students, the estimation results using
the Add Health dataset suggest that the constant peer pressure model should be too
restrictive to provide consistent estimates.
To our knowledge, only a handful of papers consider social influence status (measured
by network centralities) in structural peer effects analysis. In the spatial autoregressive
model, Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou (2009) develop a model that shows
the Nash equilibrium outcome of each individual in the network is proportional to
the individual’s Katz–Bonacich centrality measure, which is assumed to capture all
the direct and indirect influences of the network on a given individual. An important
empirical impaction of their approach is: the more central (in terms of Katz-Bonacich
centrality) a person in a network, the higher level is her outcome (i.e. criminal activity).
In contrast, we do not construct the network centrality measure from direct and indirect
peer effects, but rather use the Katz–Bonacich centrality as an exogenous observable.
Observations of such a measure directly obtain from the Add Health dataset. Another
important related paper is Liu and Lee (2010), who use the Katz–Bonacich centrality
as an instrumental variable for peer effects in a linear social interaction model. In our
structural approach, we assume that friends’ Katz–Bonacich centralities affect peer
pressures on a player and therefore affect her outcome directly.
To solve the computational burden for solving the equilibrium of a large network
game, we apply Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007)’s nested pseudo likelihood estimation
(NPLE) approach to estimate our large network game model. It is a natural idea to
extend Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007)’ approach to large network games: Similar to
dynamic games, because of the large dimensionality issue, it is costly to compute the
3
equilibrium in a large network game using fixed point algorithms. The NPLE method
starts with an arbitrary guess of the choice probabilities, e.g. the predicted choice
probabilities from the standard Logit estimation without strategic interactions. Then we
conduct another Logit estimation by using the predicted friends’ choice probabilities
as individual’s expectation on friends’ equilibrium behaviors. After that, we obtain an
update of the predicted choice probabilities. We repeat this updating procedure until
it converges. Therefore, NPLE is an iterative algorithm which consists of a sequence
of Logit estimations. The contraction condition established in Kasahara and Shimotsu
(2012) ensures the convergence of the algorithm. In a large social network game, the
NPLE is attractive to practitioners due to simplicity of implementation and less time
consuming.
Using the Add Health dataset, we investigate peer effects on conducting dangerous
behaviors of high school students. Our results show that peer effects are statistically
significant and positive. Moreover, given friends chooses “not conducting dangerous
behaviors”, then a high school student should benefit more (statistically significant at
the 5% level) from her conformity, or equivalently, pays more for her disobedience, in
terms of peer pressures, if friends have higher social-influence status. We also compare
results from our model with Xu (forthcoming)’s model and the standard Logit model.
In particular, the peer effects are insignificant in Xu (forthcoming)’s model. In the Logit
model, coefficient estimate for friends’ social influence status is negative and statistically
significant at the 5% level. Such a result suggests a negative correlation between players’
decisions and their friends social influence status. However, it is implausible to give it a
meaningful economics interpretation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model and the
definition of the Katz–Bonacich centrality. We also characterize the equilibrium and
establish its uniqueness. Section 3 establishes the identification of structural parameters
and provides NPLE. Asymptotic properties for NPLE are established and finite sample
performance is studied by Monte Carlo experiments. Section 4 applies our estimation
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method to study peer effects of high school students on dangerous behaviors. Proofs of
our results are collected in the Appendix.
2. A MODEL OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONS IN LARGE NETWORKS
We consider a discrete game played on an existing large social network. The network
is viewed as a random graph with vertex connected with directed edges: In the graph,
each individual i ∈ I ≡ {1, · · · , n} is represented by a vertex, who is connected to
a group of best friends, represented by directed edges. Let `ij = 1 if individual i
nominates j as a best friend, and `ij = 0 otherwise. Following convention, let `ii = 0
for all i ∈ I. Moreover, we denote Fi = {j ∈ I : `ij = 1} as the group of i’s best friends.
By definition, best–friend relationship needs not be symmetric in our directed network;
in other words, `ij 6= `ji is allowed. Furthermore, we denote the network graph by an
n× n matrix L where the ij–th entry is `ij .
Using graph theory, different metrics have been developed to quantify the influence of
every node within a network (see e.g. Borgatti and Everett, 2006). In directed networks,
for instance, Knoke and Burt (1983) use the number of outgoing links and the number
of incoming links to measure influence and support, respectively. Such kind of degree
measures however are criticized for not taking into account those indirect connections
to all the individuals in the network, but only immediate ones. Instead, we use Katz–
Bonacich centrality measure as our social influence metric, as is suggested by e.g.
Bonacich (1987) in the sociology literature. Specifically, for i = 1, · · · , n, let
Si =
∞∑
k=1
n∑
j=1
λk × (Lk)ji. (1)
where λ ∈ (0, 1) is the so–called attenuation factor. Note that∑nj=1(Lk)ji is the number
of individuals who are k steps away from i in the network, where the network distance
from i to j is defined as the smallest number of (directed) links that connects i to j. By
definition, Si = 0 if Fi = ∅.
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For our empirical application, the Add Health dataset contains such a measure with
λ = 0.1. Figure 1 provides a probability distribution of Si (conditional on Si > 0). In
particular, the shadow area is the 95% confidence interval. According to the picture, Si
varies across individuals.
FIGURE 1. Density function of Katz-Bonacich Centrality
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In our network game, each individual simultaneously chooses Yi ∈ {0, 1}. In our
empirical application, Yi = 1 refers to student i conducting dangerous behaviors in a
recent period. Then the utility function of i is given by
Ui =
 X ′iβ1 + 1Qi
∑
j∈Fi α1(Sj − Si)× 1(Yj = 1)− 1i, if Yi = 1;
X ′iβ0 +
1
Qi
∑
j∈Fi α0(Sj − Si)× 1(Yj = 0)− 0i, if Yi = 0,
(2)
where Xi ∈ Rd includes a constant and a vector of individual i’s demographic character-
istics, 0i, 1i ∈ R are unobserved action–dependent utility shocks, and Qi ≡
∑n
j=1 Lji =∑n
j=1 1(j ∈ Fi) denotes the total number of friends. For expositional simplicity, we
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assume Qi ≥ 1 in (2).1 Moreover, β1, β2 ∈ Rd are payoff coefficients, α0(·) and α1(·) are
unknown structural functions. In particular, α1 measures peer pressures on player i
from her friend j choosing the same action of dangerous behaviors, i.e. Yi = Yj = 1. A
similar interpretation applies to α0. Furthermore, α†(Sj −Si) ≡ α1(Sj −Si) +α0(Sj −Si)
measures the total peer effects that lead to conformity among friends in a social network.
It is worth pointing out that the payoff of action 0 is not “normalized” to zero. In
our influence–dependent social interaction model, zero–payoff for action 0 is not an
innocuous normalization for reasons to be discussed later. See Buchholz, Shum, and Xu
(2016) for a similar but more detailed argument.
In the above payoff function, a key feature is that α1(Sj − Si) and α0(Sj − Si) depend
on friend j’s relative social influence Sj − Si. Such a specification on peer effects is
related to social influence models used in sociology, e.g. Friedkin and Johnsen (1990).
In our empirical application, we investigate the question, if an individual’s friends
choose (not) to conduct dangerous behaviors, whether the amount of peer pressures
from friends increases with friends’ social influence.
Next, we specify the information structure: Let Xi and L be publicly observed state
variables, and (0i, 1i) be player i’s private information. Note that because Fi and
Si are derived from L, therefore they are also publicly observed state variables. Let
W = {(X ′1, · · · , X ′n)′;L} be all the public information in the game. According to the
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) solution concept, the best response function is given by
Ri(W, i) = 1
{
X ′i(β1 − β0)−
∑
j∈Fi
α0(Sj − Si)
Qi
+
∑
j∈Fi
α†(Sj − Si)P(Yj = 1|W)
Qi
− ∗i ≥ 0
}
,
where ∗ = 1 − 0. In equilibrium, players decisions can be written by
Yi = Ri(W, i), ∀i ≤ n.
1The case of Qi = 0 can be accommodated simply by letting Ui = X ′iβd if Yi = d.
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2.1. Equilibrium Characterization. To characterize the equilibrium, we first make an
assumption on the distribution of i.
Assumption A. The error terms {(0i, 1i) : i ≤ n} are distributed i.i.d. across both actions
and players. Furthermore, the error term has an extreme value distribution with density
f(t) = exp(−t) exp(− exp(−t)).
Assumption A is fairly standard in discrete choice model literature, e.g. Bajari, Hong,
Krainer, and Nekipelov (2012). As a matter of fact, Assumption A provides a closed–
form expression for players’ best responses in terms of choice probabilities.
Let σ∗i (W) = P(Yi = 1|W) be the equilibrium choice probability of choosing action
one. Let further α¯0i(·) = α0(·)/Qi and α¯†i (·) = α†(·)/Qi. Under Assumption A, the best
response function can be written in terms of equilibrium choice probabilities, i.e., for
i = 1, · · · , n,
σ∗i (W) =
exp
{
X ′i(β1 − β0)−
∑
j∈Fi α¯0i(Sj − Si) +
∑
j∈Fi α¯
†
i (Sj − Si)σ∗j (W)
}
1 + exp
{
X ′i(β1 − β0)−
∑
j∈Fi α¯0i(Sj − Si) +
∑
j∈Fi α¯i(Sj − Si)σ∗j (W)
} . (3)
To ensure the equation system (3) admits a unique solution, we next introduce an
assumption on the strength of peer effects. Let S0 be the support of Sj − Si where j ∈ Fi.
Assumption B. Let sup
s∈S0
∣∣α0(s) + α1(s)∣∣ < 4.
Under Assumption B, the dependence of the equilibrium choices satisfies the mixing
conditions, which serve as a key to dependent data analysis. Similar assumptions for
equilibrium uniqueness in Bayesian games can also be found in e.g. Brock and Durlauf
(2001); Horst and Scheinkman (2006) and Xu (forthcoming).
Theorem 1. Under assumptions A and B, there exists a unique pure strategy BNE for any n.
Theorem 1 is important for statistical inference on large network games. When there are
multiple equilibria, an obvious obstacle for statistical inference is the incompleteness of
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the econometrics model. For more discussions on issues of multiple equilibria, see e.g.
Tamer (2010, 2003) and de Paula (2013).
3. IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION
For tractability, we linearize α(·) for our empirical analysis: Let α0(s) = φ0 + φ1 × s
and α1(s) = ψ0 +ψ1×s. By definition, α†(s) = α0(s)+α1(s) = φ0 +ψ0 +(φ1 +ψ1)×s. By
the equilibrium condition (3), β1 and β0 cannot be separately identified in the structural
model, since only their difference β1 − β0 matters for the equilibrium. Therefore, we set
β0 = 0 as a normalization.
3.1. Identification. First, note that σ∗i (W) obtains directly from the distribution of ob-
servables. Following the definition of identification (see e.g. Hurwicz, 1950), we treat
σ∗i (W) as a known object.2 Let Ti = lnσ∗i (W)− ln[1− σ∗i (W)]. It follows by (3) that
Ti = X
′
iβ1 − φ0 − φ1
∑
j∈Fj S¯ji
Qi
+ (φ0 + ψ0)
∑
j∈Fi σ
∗
j (W)
Qi
+ (φ1 + ψ1)
∑
j∈Fi S¯jiσ
∗
j (W)
Qi
,
where S¯ji = Sj − Si. Note that φ0 cannot be separately identified from the constant term
of X ′β1. Therefore, let φ0 = 0 as a normalization. It follows that
Ti = X
′
iβ1 − φ1
∑
j∈Fi S¯ji[1− σ∗j (W)]
Qi
+ ψ0
∑
j∈Fi σ
∗
j (W)
Qi
+ ψ1
∑
j∈Fi S¯jiσ
∗
j (W)
Qi
,
which takes a linear expression of structural parameters.
Let θ ≡ (β1, φ1, ψ0, ψ1) ∈ Θ ⊆ Rd × R3+, where Θ is the parameter space. The positive-
ness of φ1, ψ0 and ψ1 reflects the fundamental principal in sociology that friends benefit
from conformity. Let θ0 and θ be the true parameter for the data generating process and
a generic value in Θ, respectively. Moreover, we denote
Zi ≡
(
X ′i,
∑
j∈Fi S¯ji[σ
∗
j (W)− 1]
Qi
,
∑
j∈Fi σ
∗
j (W)
Qi
,
∑
j∈Fi S¯jiσ
∗
j (W)
Qi
)′
∈ Rd+3.
2See Xu (forthcoming) for a detailed discussion on the definition of identification in a single large
network game model.
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Assumption C. E(ZiZ ′i) have full rank, i.e., Rank (E(ZiZ ′i)) = d+ 3.
Assumption C is a high–level rank condition that requires no perfect collinearity of Zi.
Such a full rank condition can hold if (i) Xi has no perfect collinearity; (ii) conditional
on (Xi, Si, Qi, {Sj : j ∈ Fi}), {σ∗j (W) : j ∈ Fi} has no perfect collinearity; (iii) For every
j ∈ Fi, conditional on (Xi, Fi/{j}), we have 0 < P(j ∈ Fi) < 1. In particular, the last
condition requires variations in Qi given Xi. Note that Assumption C is testable given
Zi can be nonparametrically estimated (see Xu, forthcoming).
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumptions A to C hold. Then θ0 is identified by[
E
(
ZiZ
′
i
)]−1
E
(
ZiTi
)
. (4)
The proof directly follows our discussions above, and hence is omitted.
It is worth pointing out that if friends’ relative social influences have a strictly positive
effect on peer pressures, i.e., φ1 > 0 and/or ψ1 > 0, then ignoring such an effect will
necessarily induce omitted variable bias to the estimation of peer effects. To see this,
suppose equilibrium beliefs {σ∗j (W) : j = 1, · · · , n} are observed in the data. Then
a Logit estimation without including
∑
j∈Fi S¯ji[σ
∗
j (W)−1]
Qi
and
∑
j∈Fi S¯jiσ
∗
j (W)
Qi
as regressors
would be inconsistent due to their correlation with
∑
j∈Fi σ
∗
j (W)
Qi
, the regressor for the
constant peer effect coefficient ψ0.
3.2. Estimation. Our estimation follows Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007)’s NPLE ap-
proach. Similarly to their dynamic setting, the difficulties in large network games arise
from the computational burden of solving the equilibrium. Using an iterative algorithm,
the NPLE significantly reduces the computational burden, albeit it is less efficient than
the maximum (pseudo) likelihood estimation approach (see Xu, forthcoming). More
importantly, the proposed approach is essentially a sequence of Logit estimations.,
which is easy to implement.
Consider a random sample {(Yi, Xi, Fi) : i = 1, · · · , n} from a single large social net-
work. It is worth pointing out that our approach can be easily extended to applications
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where observations come from a small number of networks but each network has a
large size. In both cases, our asymptotic analysis relies on the number of players going
to infinity.
Under this parametric specification, we are particularly interested in testing H0 : φ1 =
ψ1 = 0 versus H1 : φ1 6= 0 or ψ1 6= 0. In such a significance test, rejection of the null
hypotheses provides evidence for causal effects from friends’ social influence on peer
pressures.
3.3. NPLE algorithm. Let Σ∗(W) =
(
σ∗1(W), · · · , σ∗n(W)
)′ and Σ = (σ1, · · · , σn)′ ∈
[0, 1]n be the equilibrium choice probability profile and a generic probability profile,
respectively. For arbitrary Σ ∈ [0, 1]n, let
Zi(Σ) ≡
(
X ′i,
∑
j∈Fi S¯ji(σj − 1)
Qi
,
∑
j∈Fi σj
Qi
,
∑
j∈Fi S¯jiσj
Qi
)′
and
Γi(Σ, θ;W) =
exp[Z ′i(Σ)θ]
1 + exp[Z ′i(Σ)θ]
.
Moreover, we denote Σ(θ;W) as the solution to the equation system:
Γi(Σ, θ;W) = σi, ∀ i ≤ n.
By definition, Σ∗(W) = Σ(θ0;W). Furthermore, let
Lˆn(θ,Σ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
{Yi ln Γi(Σ, θ;W) + (1− Yi) ln [1− Γi(Σ, θ;W)]} ;
L(θ,Σ) = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
E {Yi ln Γi(Σ, θ;W) + (1− Yi) ln [1− Γi(Σ, θ;W)]} .
Note that L(θ,Σ) is defined as the limiting log-likelihood function as the network size
goes to infinity.
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Given the above notation, we are ready to describe our estimation procedure: First,
we start with an arbitrary initial value Σ[0] ∈ [0, 1]n, w.l.o.g., let Σ[0] = (0, · · · , 0) ∈ [0, 1]n.
Next, we iterate the following two steps:
Step 1. Given Σ[j−1], let
θˆ[j] = argmaxθ∈Θ Lˆn(θ,Σ
[j−1]).
Step 2. Given θˆ[j], let
Σ[j] = Γ(Σ[j−1], θˆ[j];W),
where Γ(Σ, θ;W) =
(
Γ1(Σ, θ;W), · · · ,Γn(Σ, θ;W)
)′. This procedure stops at the K–th
iteration when ‖θˆ[K] − θˆ[K−1]‖ is less than a predetermined tolerance, e.g., 10−6. Then,
we define our estimator by θˆNPLE = θˆ[K]. The convergence of the NPLE algorithm is
ensured by the local contraction condition established in Kasahara and Shimotsu (2012).
By definition, the above NPLE is essentially a fixed point solution to maximize the
log-likelihood function, which can be equivalently defined by
θˆNPLE = argmaxθ∈Θ Lˆn(θ,Σ),
s.t. Σ = Γ(Σ, θ;W).
See e.g. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) for a more detailed discussion.
3.4. Asymptotic analysis. We make further assumptions to establish asymptotic prop-
erties of θˆNPLE .
Assumption D. The underlying parameter θ0 uniquely solves the following equation:
θ = argmaxc∈Θ L(c,Σ(θ;W)).
Assumption D is essentially an identification assumption for the pseudo log–likelihood
function L(c,Σ(θ;W)). It is straightforward that θ0 solves the moment equation: θ0
maximizes L(·,Σ∗(W)) by the standard argument for MLE and note that Σ∗(W ) =
12
Σ(θ0;W). The true parameter θ0 being the unique solution can be ensured if the func-
tion argmaxc∈Θ L(c,Σ(θ;W)) is a contraction mapping from Θ to Θ.3 Such a condition
highlights the identification power of the “true” log–likelihood: either L(·,Σ(·;W)) de-
rived from the game structure, or L(·,Σ∗(W)) that depends on unobserved equilibrium
beliefs Σ∗(W). When the moment equation in Assumption D is sufficient for (global)
identification of θ0, then the MLE approach can be simplified by the NPLE algorithm.
Assumption D can be verified by the data. If it fails, as Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2007) suggest, the NPLE algorithm should be modified by selecting the fixed point that
maximizes the value of the pseudo likelihood.
Assumption E. SX is bounded and Θ is compact.
Assumption E ensures that choice probabilities derived from the model are uniformly
bounded away from zero, which implies that Lˆn(·,Σ[j]) is also uniformly bounded for
all j.
Assumption F. Let maxi ∈ {1, · · · , n}
∑n
j=1 `ij ≤M for some constant M ∈ N+.
Assumption G is needed to limit the dependence among all the observations. In our
Add Health dataset, M = 10.
For any h ∈ N and i ∈ I, let N(i,h) = {j ∈ I : (Lk)ji = 1 for some k ≤ h}. More-
over, let L(i,h) be a #N(i,h) ×#N(i,h) submatrix of L which describes the graph for the
subnetwork among N(i,h).
Assumption G. Fix arbitrary h ∈ N. The probability distribution of L(i,h) converges to a
limiting distribution as n→∞ for all i; and L(i,h) is independent of L(j,h) if N(i,h) ∩N(j,h) = ∅.
Moreover, the payoff covariates Xi are i.i.d. across players given the exogenous random network.
In the large network asymptotics, Assumption G is also made in Xu (forthcoming) for
the consistency of an MLE–type estimator. In particular, this condition requires that the
3It is worth pointing out that in the proof of Theorem 1 players’ best responses are shown to be a
contraction mapping in the space of strategy profiles, but not in the parameter space.
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distribution of subgraphs should converge to a limit as the network size goes to infinity,
and two non–overlapping subgraphs have independent connecting structures.
Theorem 2. Suppose Assumptions A to G hold. In particular, Assumption B holds for all
θ ∈ Θ. Then
θˆNPLE
p→ θ0.
In Theorem 2, we need restrict the parameter space for α(·) such that Assumption B
holds for all θ ∈ Θ. Similar to the stationary restriction in the autoregressive model, such
a condition imposes restrictions on (φ1, ψ0, ψ1) that depend on the support of Sj − Si.
Following Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), we now derive the limiting distribution
of θˆNPLE . Let An = E
[
ZiZ
′
iσ
∗
i (W)(1 − σ∗i (W)) + 1Qi
∑
j∈Fi ZiZ
′
jσ
∗
j (W)(1 − σ∗j (W))(ψ0 +
(φ1 + ψ1)S¯ji)
]
and Bn = E
[
ZiZ
′
i(Yi − σ∗i (W))2
]
. Note that An and Bn depend on index n
through W.
Assumption H. θ0 belongs to the interior of Θ.
Assumption I. There exist non–singular (R+3)×(R+3) matrixA andB such thatAn → A
and Bn → B.
Assumption H is standard in the asymptotics theory. Assumption I is a high level
condition which requires (i) An and Bn converge to some non–singular limiting matrices
respectively as the network size goes to infinity. Such a condition could be derived by
specifying a network growing mechanism. Moreover, the non–degeneracy of A and
B requires that all the determinants of An and Bn should be outside of an open ball of
zero for all n, which is essentially a rank condition.
Theorem 3. Suppose all the conditions in Theorem 2 and Assumptions H and I hold. Then we
have
√
n(θˆNPLE − θ0) d→ N
(
0,Ω0
)
,
where Ω0 = A−1BA−1.
14
3.5. Monte Carlo Experiments. In this section, we investigate the finite sample per-
formance of our estimator by using Monte Carlo experiments. First, we simulate a
large network: The number of friends Qi of each player is drawn uniformly from
{0, 1, 2, · · · , 10}. Given Qi, player i randomly nominates her friends among all individ-
uals for generating Fi. Moreover, we set Xi = (1,W ′i , Si)′ ∈ R5 where Wi consists of
three independent elements: The first element is uniformly distributed on [−√3,√3],
the second is a standard normal random variable, and the last conforms to a trans-
formed Bernoulli distribution 2× B(0.5)− 1 ∈ {−1, 1}. In this setting, every element
of Wi has mean zero and variance one. Following the Add Health dataset, we calcu-
late the Katz-Bonacich centrality measure Si by (1) with λ = 0.1. In this specification,
β = (β0, β1, β2, β3, β4)
′ ∈ R5 and (φ1, ψ0, ψ1) ∈ R3+.
Furthermore, we choose sample size n = 400, 800, and 1600. All results are drawn
from 1000 replications. We set β = (−1, 1,−1, 1,−1)′, (φ1, ψ0, ψ1) = (1, 1, 1)′, (1, 1, 0)′,
(0, 1, 0)′, and (1, 2, 0)′, respectively.4 Tables 1 and 2 report the finite sample performance
of θˆNPLE , including average bias, standard deviation (in parentheses) and mean square
error. In all of our experiments, the estimator behaves well. In particular, the mean
squared error decreases at the rate n as the sample size increases.
4. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION: DANGEROUS BEHAVIORS OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
In this section we apply our method to study peer effects on the dangerous behaviors
of high school students. Adolescent risky behaviors have been studied in terms of
peer effects (see e.g. Nakajima, 2007; Gaviria and Raphael, 2001). To the best of our
knowledge, however, there is no structural analysis on social influence dependent
peer effects in the current literature. In particular, the research question we ask is
how students of high social influence status, who typically are less likely to conduct
4We also consider other values of β and (φ1, ψ0, ψ1). The results are qualitatively similar.
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TABLE 1. Simulation Results: Average Bias and Standard Deviation
(φ1, ψ0, ψ1) n β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 φ1 ψ0 ψ1
(1, 1, 1) 400 -0.012 0.040 -0.028 0.045 -0.044 0.036 -0.010 -0.097
(0.698) (0.175) (0.183) (0.175) (0.587) (0.742) (1.163) (1.960)
800 0.010 0.019 -0.016 0.019 -0.041 0.005 -0.015 -0.119
(0.426) (0.124) (0.120) (0.117) (0.381) (0.479) (0.755) (1.322)
1600 -0.014 0.011 -0.010 0.010 -0.004 -0.010 -0.016 0.024
(0.335) (0.081) (0.088) (0.085) (0.288) (0.359) (0.549) (0.900)
(1, 1, 0) 400 -0.016 0.044 -0.030 0.049 -0.045 0.046 0.004 -0.080
(0.704) (0.176) (0.185) (0.178) (0.594) (0.749) (1.159) (1.955)
800 0.008 0.019 -0.016 0.020 -0.039 0.004 -0.022 -0.127
(0.427) (0.123) (0.120) (0.119) (0.384) (0.478) (0.746) (1.330)
1600 -0.015 0.011 -0.011 0.010 -0.001 -0.010 -0.023 0.011
(0.333) (0.081) (0.087) (0.085) (0.290) (0.363) (0.551) (0.914)
(0, 1, 0) 400 -0.014 0.040 -0.030 0.042 -0.035 0.016 -0.030 -0.030
(0.704) (0.175) (0.174) (0.171) (0.590) (0.708) (1.102) (1.943)
800 0.007 0.018 -0.018 0.019 -0.038 -0.006 -0.020 -0.119
(0.432) (0.123) (0.121) (0.114) (0.387) (0.454) (0.718) (1.308)
1600 -0.011 0.008 -0.008 0.010 -0.004 -0.009 -0.026 0.027
(0.336) (0.078) (0.084) (0.082) (0.290) (0.348) (0.521) (0.900)
(1, 2, 0) 400 -0.012 0.038 -0.030 0.041 -0.041 0.032 0.016 -0.061
(0.659) (0.169) (0.176) (0.167) (0.546) (0.746) (1.019) (1.695)
800 0.005 0.015 -0.016 0.016 -0.031 -0.002 -0.003 -0.101
(0.416) (0.120) (0.118) (0.113) (0.373) (0.486) (0.663) (1.178)
1600 -0.015 0.009 -0.009 0.010 -0.002 -0.013 0.000 -0.010
(0.315) (0.079) (0.085) (0.082) (0.272) (0.363) (0.486) (0.788)
TABLE 2. Simulation Results: Mean Square Error
(φ1, ψ0, ψ1) n β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 φ1 ψ0 ψ1
(1, 1, 1) 400 0.487 0.032 0.034 0.033 0.346 0.552 1.352 3.848
800 0.181 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.146 0.229 0.570 1.761
1600 0.112 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.083 0.129 0.301 0.809
(1, 1, 0) 400 0.496 0.033 0.035 0.034 0.355 0.563 1.341 3.824
800 0.183 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.149 0.228 0.556 1.784
1600 0.111 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.084 0.132 0.304 0.834
(0, 1, 0) 400 0.495 0.032 0.031 0.031 0.349 0.502 1.215 3.774
800 0.186 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.151 0.206 0.516 1.724
1600 0.113 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.084 0.121 0.272 0.809
(1, 2, 0) 400 0.434 0.030 0.032 0.030 0.299 0.557 1.039 2.873
800 0.173 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.140 0.236 0.439 1.396
1600 0.100 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.074 0.132 0.236 0.620
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TABLE 3. Summary of Statistics of Key Variables from the Data
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Deviation
Risky Behaviors 0 1 0.44 0.50
Age 10 19 15.18 1.64
Female 0 1 0.52 0.54
KB Centrality 0 3.14 0.82 0.60
Ave. Friends’ KB Centrality 0 2.68 0.84 0.49
Number of friends 0 10 4.86 2.86
dangerous behaviors, affect their peers through the network. There is no doubt that they
should affect more people given their high centrality in the network, but do they impose
more peer pressures than ordinary peers do to their followers (i.e. direct friends)? In
this paper, we use the self-report questionnaires from the National Longitudinal Study of
Adolescent Health (Add Health) dataset to study this empirical question.
4.1. Add Health Dataset. The Add Health is a longitudinal study of a nationally repre-
sentative sample of adolescents in grades 7-12 in the United States during the 1994-95
school year. Add Health combines longitudinal survey data on respondents’ social and
economic features with contextual data on the family, friendships and peer groups. In
the dataset, each student has nominations of at most five male friends and at most five
female friends, which allows us to construct a social network among observations. From
the Wave I survey, we have 85,627 students from more than 100 representative schools
in all regions of the united states. In this study, we pick a pair of sister schools, i.e. No.
62 and No. 162, with a significant proportion of inter-school friend nominations. Our
sample contains 2,460 students. Table 3 provides summary statistics of the observables.
Observed demographic characteristics include age and gender, as well as the Katz-
Bonacich (KB) centrality measure. The average friends’ KB centrality measure is con-
structed from the friends nominations. The dependent variable is constructed by using
the self-report questionnaires in the Add Health dataset. Specifically, the survey ques-
tion is “During the past twelve months, how often did you do something dangerous
because you were dared to?”
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4.2. Empirical Results. Table 4 reports our estimate results. Clearly, male students are
more “dared to” do dangerous things than female students, and students of higher
social influence status are less likely to conduct dangerous behaviors. The effects of age
however are not significant. Moreover, we find significant peer pressures on a player of
choosing the same action, when his friends choose dangerous behaviors. However, such
peer effects are insignificantly affected by friends’ relative social influence status. On the
other hand, when his friends choose to avoid dangerous behaviors, we find significant
effects on peer pressures from friends social influence status, i.e., given friends make
the decision of not conducting dangerous behavior, a student benefits more from his
conformity, or pays more for his disobedience, if his friends are of high social influence
than friends are low social influence.
We also compare results from our model with two other models: the constant peer
effects (CPE) model in Xu (forthcoming) and the standard Logit model. Note that
the CPE model is nested in our model. Moreover, our model and the CPE model
are structural approaches while the Logit model is of reduced–form. The coefficient
estimates for age and gender are quite similar across three models. Effects from own
social influence status are similar in our model and the Logit model. Moreover, both
φ1 and ψ0 are statistically significant at the 5% level. In contrast, peer effects are
insignificant in the CPE model. We also include the average friends’ relative social
influence into the Logit model, even an economics interpretation for its coefficient is
implausible. The estimate of its coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the
5% level. Such a result suggests a negative correlation between players’ decisions and
their friends social influence status.
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APPENDIX A. PROOFS
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. We show by contradiction. Let Σ∗(W) = (σ∗1(W), · · · , σ∗n(W))′ and Σ†(W) = (σ†1(W), · · · , σ†n(W))′
be two different profiles of equilibrium choice probabilities. Suppose Σ∗(W) 6= Σ†(W). For
Σ ∈ [0, 1]n, let
Γi(Σ,W) ≡
exp
{
β(Xi) +
∑
j∈Fi α¯(Sj − Si)× σj(W)
}
1 + exp
{
β(Xi) +
∑
j∈Fi α¯(Sj − Si)× σj(W)
} .
By definition, Σ∗(W) and Σ†(W) are two different solutions to the following equation:
σi = Γi (Σ,W) , ∀ i = 1, · · · , n.
For player i, note that
σ∗i (W)− σ†i (W) =
∑
j∈Fi
∂Γi(Σ˜,W)
∂σj
× [σ∗j (W)− σ†j(W)]
=
∑
j∈Fi
Γi(Σ˜,W)× [1− Γi(Σ˜,W)]× α¯(Sj − Si)×
[
σ∗j (W)− σ†j(W)
]
where Σ˜ is a choice probability between Σ∗(W) and Σ†(W). Because Γi ∈ (0, 1), then Γi × (1−
Γi) ≤ 1/4. Therefore,∣∣∣σ∗i (W)− σ†i (W)∣∣∣ ≤ 14 ∑
j∈Fi
∣∣∣α¯(Sj − Si)× [σ∗j (W)− σ†j(W)]∣∣∣
≤ 1
4
max
j∈Fi
|σ∗j (W)− σ†j(W)| × sup
s∈S0
|α(s)|
By Assumption B, we have∣∣∣σ∗i (W)− σ†i (W)∣∣∣ < max
j∈Fi
∣∣∣σ∗j (W)− σ†j(W)∣∣∣ .
Therefore,
max
i∈{1,··· ,n}
∣∣∣σ∗i (W)− σ†i (W)∣∣∣ < max
j∈{1,··· ,n}
∣∣∣σ∗j (W)− σ†j(W)∣∣∣
leads to a contradiction. 
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A.2. Proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. Let
Ln(θ,Σ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
{
Yi ln Γi(Σ, θ;W) + (1− Yi) ln [1− Γi(Σ, θ;W)]
}
.
and Λn = {θ ∈ Θ : θ = argmaxc∈Θ Ln(c,Σ(θ;W))}.
Note that Ln(·,Σ(·;W)) is a continuously differentiable function in θ ∈ Θ. Because
E
[
Yi ln Γi(Σ, θ;W)
]
= E
[
σ∗i (W) ln Γi(Σ, θ;W)
]
,
which is a continuously differentiable function of θ ∈ Θ with bounded derivatives (uniformly
over n), thus Ln(·,Σ(·;W)) uniformly converges to L(·,Σ(·;W)) under Assumption G. It follows
that Λn → {θ0} as n→∞.
Moreover, following Xu (forthcoming), we have
sup
θ∈Θ
|Lˆn(θ,Σ)− Ln(θ,Σ)| p→ 0.
Further, by the argument in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007),
dH(θˆNPLE ,Λn)
p→ 0,
where dH is the Hausdorff–distance measure. Therefore, θˆNPLE
p→ θ0. 
A.3. Proof of Theorem 3.
Proof. From the first order condition we have that
∂Lˆn(θˆNPLE ,Σ(θˆNPLE ;W))
∂θ
= 0.
Take Taylor expansion on the above equation around the true parameter θ0, we have
∂Lˆn(θ0,Σ(θ0;W))
∂θ
+
[
∂2Lˆn(θ0,Σ(θ0;W))
∂θ∂θ′
+
∂2Lˆn(θ0,Σ(θ0;W))
∂θ∂Σ
∂Σ(θ0;W)
∂θ
]
(θˆNPLE − θ0)
= Op(n
−1).
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Note that
∂Lˆn(θ,Σ)
∂θ
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
Zi(Yi − Γi(Σ, θ;W))
Therefore,
∂2Lˆn(θ0,Σ)
∂θ∂θ′
= − 1
n
n∑
i=1
ZiZ
′
iσi(1− σi)
and
∂2Lˆn(θ,Σ(θ;W))
∂θ∂Σ
∂Σ(θ;W)
∂θ
= − 1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Fi
ZiZ
′
jσ
∗
j (1− σ∗j )×
ψ0 + (φ1 + ψ1)S¯ji
Qi
.
Therefore,[
∂2Lˆn(θ0,Σ(θ0;W))
∂θ∂θ′
+
∂2Lˆn(θ0,Σ(θ0;W))
∂θ∂Σ
∂Σ(θ0;W)
∂θ
]
×√n(θˆNPLE − θ0)
= − 1√
n
n∑
i=1
Z ′i{Yi − σ∗i (W)}+ op(1)
Because Yi is conditionally independent (conditional onWn), by conditional central limit theorem
(see e.g. Van der Vaart, 2000) and Assumption I, we have
√
n(θˆNPLE − θ0) d−→ N(0,Ω(θ0))
where Ω(θ0) is given by Theorem 3 
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